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No one problem has plagued the administration of Subchapter C
of the Internal Revenue Code' as much as the multiplicity of
transactions that fall generally under the "liquidation-rein-
corporation" rubric. In recent years a rash of cases have involved
rather sophisticated devices for steering through the interstices of
Subchapter C in order to bail out corporate earnings and profits
without dividend treatment. The courts, particularly the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals2 and occasionally the Tax Court,3 have struggled to
formulate equally sophisticated responses to the bail-out schemes to
justify the congressional faith that the Internal Revenue Service and
the courts could cope with this problem without a "special statutory
provision." 4
Recently the case of the Estate of Henry P. Lammerts5 created a
substantial division among the judges of the Tax Court as to the
appropriate judicial doctrine to apply to liquidation-reincorporation
situations. The majority of the court, in an opinion written by Judge
Erwin, relied on the traditional, rigid approach to these cases, an
approach which accepts the independent identity of each taxpayer
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. B.A. 1949, J.D. 1951, University of
Iowa. Corporations Editor, JOURNAL OF TAXATION.
I. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 301-95.
2. See, e.g., Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1018 (1967); Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1022 (1967).
3. See, e.g., James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964); John G. Moffat, 42 T.C. 558 (1964),
affd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied. 386 U.S. 1016 (1967).
4. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954). The Senate-House conference
committee on the 1954 Code rejected legislation to deal with the liquidation-reincorporation
problem. As the managers of the bill in the House explained:
The House bill in section 357 contained a provision dealing with a device whereby it has
been attempted to withdraw corporate earnings at capital gains rate by distributing all
the assets of a corporation in complete liquidation and promptly reincorporating the
business assets. This provision gave rise to certain technical problems and it has not been
retained in the bill as recommended by the accompanying conference report. . . . [A]t
the present time, the possibility of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently serious to
require a special statutory provision. It is believed that this possibility can appropriately
be disposed of by judicial decision or by regulation within the framework of other
provisions of the bill.
5. 54 T.C. 420 (1970). The Tax Court decision is currently on appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. P-H 1971 FED. TAXES, CITATOR 10, 32.
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involved in the transaction. The various steps taken in consummating
the transaction are then treated, under the step transaction doctrine,
as an integrated series of steps leading to a single transaction; the
resulting transaction is tested by the traditional reorganization
concepts of sections 351-681 to determine the appropriate tax
treatment. If no reorganization can be found, then each step is treated
as a separate transaction and liquidation and distribution concepts of
sections 331-38 will normally apply, resulting in capital gain
treatment for the assets removed from the corporation.
Judge Sterrett, in a dissenting opinion joined by Judge Dawson,
approached the case along the lines originally developed by the
Commissioner in Revenue Ruling.61-156 7 and more recently used by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in deciding Reef Corp. v.
Commissioner8 and Davant v. Commissioner.' Judges Sterrett and
Dawson differ with the majority both in their willingness to treat
several taxpayers as having a substantial identity and to separate one
transaction as functionally independent from the remaining steps.
Otherwise they apply traditional reorganization concepts.
Judge Tannenwald, in a dissenting opinion joined by Judge
Simpson, developed further a theory which he set forth earlier in
Casco Products Corp.'0 That decision ignored a liquidation
transaction and treated two separate corporations as substantially
identical for tax purposes, thus bypassing completely the
reorganization provisions of the Code."
Estate of Lammerts thus articulates the three major positions
which courts are now using in liquidation-reincorporation problems.
Because of the currency and importance of these three separate
positions, an analysis of them may be beneficial both for practitioners
planning bail-out transactions and for the Internal Revenue Service
and the courts in their attempt to administer the revenue laws
equitably. Such an analysis should be of particular interest to
6. See generally B. BIrrKER &J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS &
SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 12 (2d ed. 1966).
7. 1961-2Cum. BULL. 62.
8. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cerl. denied, 386 U. S. 1018 (1967).
9. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 1022 (1967).
10. 49 T.C. 32 (1967). Judges Raum, Withney, Atkins, Scott, and Featherston dissented.
II. Lamrerts also involved questions about whether a redemption of preferred stock a year
after the liquidation was equivalent to a dividend and whether the estate had reasonable cause for
the late filing of a fiduciary income tax return. Neither question caused the court any great
difficulty, and neither was mentioned in the dissenting opinions.
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practitioners because it is probable that the sequence of transactions
which allowed a bail-out of corporate earnings following Henry
Lammerts' death was planned by Lammerts' tax counsel. If this was
not in fact the case, it could have been, and practitioners today will
certainly be wrestling with the question of whether to use a Lammerts-
type approach in attempting to achieve a similar result for clients
owning closely-held corporations.
THE LAMMERTS PLAN
Henry Lammerts, at the age of 70, executed a will in which he
directed that the executors of his estate liquidate a corporation in
which he then owned over 85 percent of the outstanding stock. The
balance of the shares were owned by his son, Parkinson, who was to
receive an interest in the operating assets of the corporation from
Henry's estate such that he would then own an undivided 25 percent
interest in those assets. The will pointed out that it was Parkinson's
desire to continue the automobile agency which the corporation was
then operating. The executors of the estate, named by the will, were
Henry's wife, Hildred, and Parkinson, the only two devisees of the
operating assets of the corporation.
Three years after the will was written, Henry died; pursuant to the
terms of the will, the executors of the estate, then holding the majority
interest of the stock of the corporation as fiduciaries, adopted a plan
of dissolution for the corporation. Beginning on December 27, 1961,
the remaining steps for achieving the liquidation and reincorporation
proceeded with dispatch. On that day the old corporation filed a
change of name with the Department of State. On January 2, 1962,
the corporation's full liquidation was achieved by distribution of all
of its assets to the executors of the estate. Immediately thereafter, the
executors distributed the operating assets of the automobile sales and
service agency to Hildred and Parkinson in the portions provided by
the will. Then, also on January 2, 1962, the third transfer took place,
when Hildred and Parkinson, acting for themselves and not as
executors, transferred their interests in the operating assets of the
automobile agency to the new corporation in exchange for stock of
that corporation. Hildred received 1,498 shares of preferred stock in
this transaction, and Parkinson received 461 shares of common stock.
Thereafter, Parkinson was the sole common shareholder and Hildred
was the sole preferred shareholder of the corporation. Held out of the
new corporation were accounts receivable in the amount of $2,688, a
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loan to the shareholders in the amount of $9,979.81, and real estate
having a book value of $78,591.65; most of these assets were retained
by Hildred.
The results of these events were that the business of the original
corporation was continued, uninterrupted, by the new corporation;
that the ownership of the business was continued, uninterrupted, by
members of the Lammerts family; and that corporate assets were
removed from the corporation in what the taxpayer hoped was a tax-
free transaction. Since the basis of the shares of the old corporation
would be stepped-up upon Henry's death, the purported liquidation
would result in no gain or loss to the shareholders; the earnings and
profits of the old corporation would receive a new basis. The
Commissioner understandably sought to tax the shareholders on the
receipt of a dividend, or a distribution in connection with a
reorganization to be treated as a dividend under section 356. He
encountered serious problems in this attempt because of the limited
means at his disposal for attacking liquidation-reincorporation
transactions. The subsequent litigation, however, triggered a split
within the Tax Court and resulted in three separate approaches to this
recurring problem.
THE TRADITIONAL, SEPARATE-ENTITY APPROACH ADOPTED BY THE
MAJORITY
Judge Irwin, writing for the majority of the Tax Court, took the
traditional approach to this type of case by strictly adhering to the
independent existence of two corporate taxpayers-the old
corporation and the new corporation. Despite the fact that the old
corporation was liquidated and dissolved on the very same day that
most of its assets were transferred to the new corporation and that the
corporate business contined without interruption, the Tax Court
found that on January 2, 1962, one taxpayer's life had ended and a
new taxpayer's life had begun. Accordingly the tax results were made
to depend upon whether the liquidation of the old corporation was
considered as a separate taxable transaction or whether it was simply
one step in a liquidation-reincorporation transaction which would be
within one of the definitions of a corporate reorgnization to be given
at least partial nonrecognition treatment under Subchapter C of the
Internal Revenue Code. Finding no reorganization, the majority
upheld the claim of the taxpayer.
There is historical precedent for this approach of treating new
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corporate entities as separate and distinct from their predecessors.
Marr v. United States,'2 decided in 1925, involved a New Jersey
corporation which succeeded completely to the assets and business of
a Delaware corporation. The New Jersey corporation then exchanged
its stock for stock of the Delaware corporation in what would now be
an "F" reorganization, "a mere change in [the] place of
organization."' 3 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that this
exchange of stock was a taxable transaction because the two
corporations were essentially different. Justice Brandeis, speaking for
the Court, stated that: -
A corporation organized under the laws of Delaware does not have the same
rights and powers as one organized under the laws of New Jersey. Because of
these inherent differences in rights and powers, both the preferred and the
common stock of the old corporation is an essentially different thing from
stock of the same general kind of the new. 4
He found support for this decision in three earlier decisions of the
Supreme Court: United States v. Phellis,5 Rockefeller v. United
States,6 and Cullinan v. Walker.17 In each of these cases he indicated
that the Court had considered a new corporate entity to be a separate
taxpayer so that an investment in one was substantially different than
an investment in the other, and an exchange of stock in one for stock
of the other was recognized as a taxable exchange. Brandeis found it
necessary to distinguish only Eisner v. Macomber8 on the grounds
that there had clearly been no change in the corporate identity, and
Weiss v. Stern, 9 on the grounds that the new entity had only technical
existence and that "[tihe corporate identity was deemed to have been
substantially maintained because the new corporation was organized
under the laws of the same state, with presumably the same powers as
the old."' 20 The four dissenting justices in Marr felt that the case fell
squarely within the doctrine of Weiss v. Stern and, since the business
and assets of the corporation had not materially changed, the
shareholders' investment had not changed sufficiently to result in a
12. 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
13. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(F).
14. 268 U.S. at 54 1.
15. 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
16. 257 U.S. 176 (1921).
17. 262 U.S. 134 (1923).
18. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
19. 265 U.S. 242 (1924).
20. 268 U.S. at 541.
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taxable transaction. Although Marr does not deal with a bail-out of
corporate earnings in a liquidation-reincorporation setting, it does
deal with whether, in the absence of a statutory non-recognition
provision, an investment in the old corporation should be considered
to be so different from an investment in the new one that a taxable
exchange has taken place. Had the Court found that there was no
income to be recognized here, it might well have led to a broader
concept of substantial identity or continuity for related corporate
entities.
Such a broader concept would have easily accommodated the idea
that the new Lammerts corporation was essentially the same as the
old and that, for tax purposes, no real change of investment interest
had taken place at the shareholder level. Accordingly, any assets
removed from the corporate solution would have to be treated under
the distribution or liquidation provisions of the Code and probably
would not qualify for capital-gain treatment.2 ' The Tax Court
confronted and rejected this argument in Joseph C. Gallagher.2 2 Judge
Opper, writing for a majority of the court, said:
The concept of a continuation of the existing business through a section 331
liquidation, coupled with an intercorporate transfer, falls into the general area
of corporate reorganizations, so that it is in the so-called reorganization
sections, if anywhere, that we should expect it to be dealt with.
. . . [G]enerally speaking, it is exactly where the same enterprise is in
essence wholly or partly continued even after some more or less radical change
in its organization or conduct that it is the purpose of the so-called
"reorganization" section of the law to operate. The basic approach of the
complicated series of enactments incorporated in the 1954 code appears to be
that all such situations are to be tested by the "reorganization" portion of the
statute, and that it was intended that if a transaction of a similar kind does not
fall within them, but lies in the general area of arrangements which may, in
effect, constitute the continuation of an existing business, it shall be treated as a
transaction giving rise to gain or loss and not as a distribution. "Y
The Tax Court, therefore, rejected the idea that, where the corporate
business contined and a corporate transfer took place, the liquidation
of the old corporation could be ignored. Had it accepted that concept,
the assets removed from corporate solution would have been treated
21. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 301-38. Most retained assets under this concept would
probably be dividends under section 301.
22. 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
23. Id. at 157-58.
[Vol, 1971:367
Vol. 1971:367) LIQUIDA TION-REINCORPORA TION
as received by the shareholders in a simple dividend distribution from
the corporation.
Thus, precedent provided ample justification for the holding of the
majority of the Tax Court that the old and new corporations were
different taxable entities. In reality, the Court did little more than fall
back on what it had previously said in Gallagher and reaffirmed in
Hyman H. Berghash.24 Since the Second Circuit, in Berghash,
resoundingly affirmed the separate-entity approach taken by the Tax
Court in Gallagher,21 it would appear that Lammerts will be affirmed
on appeal. However, since there was a substantial change in
ownership in Berghash, it may be distinguishable from Lammerts on
the grounds that, although there was a change in ownership, the
change was entirely within a close family group. Lammerts could also
be viewed as a far more flagrant use of the liquidation-reincorporation
device to obtain a bail-out of corporate earnings. These distinctions
should at least give the Second Circuit cause to reconsider its rejection
of the Commissioner's approach in Berghash and consider whether
the approach of either of the dissenting judges of the Tax Court would
be a more appropriate way to deal with the Lammerts case.
THE FUNCTIONAL RELATION APPROACH
In addition to taking a strict view of the separate identity of the
two corporations, the majority found it necessary to take a similarly
strict view with respect to the separateness, as taxpayers, of the estate
and its two beneficiaries, Hildred and Parkinson Lammerts.21 It was
on this latter point that Judge Sterrett disagreed with the majority,
permitting him to find that a "D" reorganization2 had occurred. The
majority was probably influenced by the fact that the attribution of
ownership rules of section 318 are not generally applicable to the
24. 43 T.C. 743 (1965), affd. 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966).
-25. In the Berghash case the Second Circuit said:
We are in complete agreement with the Tax Court's resolution of this issue; its
interpretation reflects the normal meaning of the words "complete liquidation" in
sections 331 and 337. To adopt the Commissioner's contention would do violence to the
plain meaning of the statutes. . . . We can only conclude that the Tax Court's result is
consistent with the intent of Congress, which considered the reincorporation problem in
1954 but rejected specific proposals for dealing with it as the Commissioner suggests. 361
F.2d at 260. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently endorsed this view in
Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 197 1). "
26. 54T.C. at 432 n.14.
27. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)(I)(D).
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Subchapter C area. Since section 318 specifically provides for those
cases where ownership may be attributed between estates and their
beneficiaries and since section 318 does not apply, the court was
technically and statutorily justified in finding that the estate was a
separate taxpayer from its two beneficiaries and that the ownership of
stock by the estate should not be considered to be indirect ownership
of that same stock by Hildred and Parkinson.2 1 Judge Sterrett,
however, felt that, in determining whether there was the necessary
"control" for purposes of the reorganization provisions,29 it was
appropriate to consider that the stock of the old corporation owned
by the estate was equitably owned by the two beneficiaries. Under
that view, the common stock of the old corporation then belonged
entirely to Hildred and Parkinson prior to the liquidation of the old
corporation. Linking the liquidation and reincorporation together as
a single transaction, it appears that there was a transfer of
substantially all of the assets of the old corporation to a new
corporation where immediately after the transfer the shareholders of
the old corporation are in control of the new corporation, the
definition of a "D" reorganization. The final condition-of the "D"
reorganization, a distribution qualifying under section 354, was also
met; all of the stock and securities deemed received in the transaction,
as well as all of the other assets of the corporation, were considered
distributed in the complete liquidation of the old corporation.
This would have been a pyrrhic victory for the Commissioner
without use of the "functional independence" doctrine developed by
the Fifth Circuit in Reef and Davant to determine that the
distribution of assets left out of corporate solution was not a part of
the "D" reorganization. If it were a part of the reorganization, the
property distributed would have been considered boot and taxed
under section 356(a) as ordinary income only to the extent of the gain
on the exchange. Since the basis for most of the stock of the old
corporation was stepped up because of Henry's death,3 there would
have been no gain on the exchange of stock and none of the boot could
28. See generally Ringel, Surrey & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal
Revenue Code, 72 HARv. L. REV. 209 (1958).
29. lNr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(D) requires that the transferor corporation or its
shareholders be "in control of' the transferee corporation immediately after the transfer.
Section 368(c) defines "control" as ownership of stock possessing 80 percent of the voting
power in the corporation and 80 percent of the total stock.
30. Id. § 1014.
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have been taxed as ordinary dividend income. Judges Sterrett and
Dawson felt, however, that the removal of property from the
corporate solution was a transaction having no necessary relationship
to the steps constituting the "D" reorganization and was therefore a
separate distribution of assets. Treated in this way as a step
functionally independent of the reorganization, the distribution of the
real estate, debt, and receivables was a simple distribution of a
dividend-in-kind, fully taxable to the shareholders as ordinary income
without regard to the basis of the stock.31
There are obvious difficulties in determining that a particular step,
which is only one of several in a planned course of action, is
functionally independent of the other steps. Unless there is some
objective way to determine that a step should not be treated as part of
a unitary transaction, courts will be reluctant to adopt this theory; the
mere fact that the revenue will thereby be increased is not likely to be
sufficient justification. If the step transaction doctrine32 is applied in
the case because all the steps are taken pursuant to one plan, what
basis is there for choosing among the planned steps only those which,
if taken together, would result in the greatest revenue? Judge Sterrett's
opinion did not deal at length with this problem; he simply stated that
the distribution appeared to be an event separate anddistinct from the
reorganization. The judge relied on the Fifth Circuit's statement in
Reef that "the test of whether events should be viewed separately or
together as part of the single plan is not temporal but is functional"3
and concluded that "[a]pplying this standard to the instant case, I fail
to see how the dividend distribution can be said to be either necessary
to or any other way rationally related to the reorganization."'3 In
some cases, such a distribution may be vitally necessary to a
transaction in order to achieve agreement between the parties to the
exchange; in other cases, it may simply be a desired part of the
transaction. The reorganization provisions contain no explicit
31. Id. §§ 301(a),301(c),316.
32. Basically, this is the doctrine that "the law will not permit what is essentially a single
transaction to be broken up into component parts with each of the component steps being given
independent significance." Hobbet, The Step Transaction Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate
Transactions, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH ANNUAL TULANE INST., 102, 103 (1970). The converse
is also part of the doctrine. See also Mintz & Plumb, Step Transaction in Corporate
Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1954); Paul & Zinet, Step
Transactions, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 (2d Series 1938).
33. 368 F.2d at 134.
34. 54 T.C. at 456 (1970).
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recognition of a distinction between the two and seemingly deal with it
as a boot distribution under section 356 in either case. Thus, to say
that the distribution here was not necessary, nor rationally related to
the reorganization is to suggest that a distribution that is part of the
plan of reorganization will not qualify for treatment as boot under
section 356 if it is not a necessary part of the plan and is included only
because the parties consider it desirable. However, the Tax Court has
consistently refused to rule that the tax results of such a transaction
depend on this distinction between necessity and desirability.35
This is not to say that Judge Sterrett's approach has no merit.
However, the inquiry into the criteria of "functionally unrelated"
should be extended beyond the simple question of whether the
challenged step is part of the reorganization. 36 This inquiry could be
advanced by giving greater attention to the fact that the Internal
Revenue Code describes many taxable events, some of which may
often be seen to overlap. Reorganization transactions or exchanges
are only one of a variety of taxable events described in the Code;
another event is a distribution of a taxable dividend. When an event
examined in isolation meets the definition of a dividend distribution
but, when combined with other steps, appears also to be a boot
distribution, the court must choose one description of the transaction
over the other. The Code provides no help in making the choice, for it
states no preference for one over the other; it only describes the two
alternatives, leaving the choice to the court.
Perhaps the motivation for including the various steps in a single
plan will be a useful basis on which the court can make its choice. It is
quite possible in one case for a reorganization transaction to be
coupled with a dividend distribution in order to avoid the tax on the
dividend, whereas in another case a cash distribution might be
coupled with what would otherwise be a reorganization transaction in
order to avoid the application of the reorganization provisions. 3 An
example of the first case would be a corporation which wanted to
make a dividend distribution to shareholders at a time when the fair
market value of the stock of the corporation was at or near the basis
of the stock in the hands of the shareholders. To accomplish this with
35. This distinction was most recently rejected in American Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. 204, 224-29
(1970). See notes 67-69 infra, and accompanying text.
36. Hobbet, supra note 32.
37. For example, cash or other property might be thrown in simply to defeat what would
otherwise be a "B" reorganization, INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a)(I)(B).
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little tax impact, the corporation might adopt a plan of
recapitalization and go through an "E" reorganization 38 coupling
the exchange of the shareholders' stock with a distribution of
securities. Since there would be little or no gain on the exchange of
shares, a limited dividend equivalence would be found under section
356.31 In such a case, can it be said that the dividend distribution of
the securities is functionally related to the recapitalization? Neither
plays a necessary role in achieving the commercial aspects of the
other; the reorganization itself plays a functional role only to the
extent that it may prevent a tax on the dividend distribution. The
absence of functional relation appears by investigating the motivation
of the parties in electing to couple the distribution with a
recapitalization.
In this way, motivation could be useful in helping to determine
functional independence. If the courts were to adopt this concept and
use it regularly in reorganization cases, a tax planner would have to be
wary of any transaction which would result in assets being removed
from the corporate solution where this removal is not useful to the
consummation of the commercial aspects of the transaction. The
inquiry into taxpayer motivation then becomes a determination of
whether the distribution would have been useful in achieving the
commercial goals of the transaction without consideration of any tax
savings by the shareholders which might occur. If a commercially
acceptable motivation is found, then the distribution would appear to
be functionally related to the reorganization.
An analogy to this investigation of motive can be found in the
cases dealing with alleged sham transactions where the only profit
anticipated in the transaction is the saving of taxes. For example, in
38. Id. § 368(a)(1)(E).
39. This would be so even though, since no securities were surrendered, the securities
received are in excess of the face value of the securities surrendered.
40. With motive isolated in this way it might be answered that the recapitalization or
reorganization would fail in any event because there is no business purpose to the
reorganization. However, the practicality of the situation is such that the business purpose
doctrine for corporate reorganization is easily met and the tax planner should have little
difficulty in stating an adequate business purpose for the recapitalization in order to support the
non-recognition status of the exchange. Therefore, since the reorganization itself would appear
to have a business purpose other than mere tax avoidance, there may be little or no way for the
court to separate the distribution from the reorganization and then to determine that the
distribution was coupled with the reorganization primarily to take advantage of an opportunity
to avoid the dividend tax. As such it would not appear to be serving any function in the
reorganization transaction and could be said to be functionally unrelated to it.
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Knetsch v. United States,4' the Supreme Court disallowed a
taxpayer's claim for interest deductions because it found that the loan
transaction on which the interest was paid was a fiction. It made this
finding primarily because it could see no commercial motivation for
the taxpayer to enter into the transaction except for the profit which
he expected from tax savings. Since the loan was a sham, the interest
payments did not fit the statutory requirements for interest
deduction 42 and were not allowed.
This type of case does not involve a choice between two different
sections of the Code, but it does examine motivation and commercial
substance to determine whether a transaction described in the Code
has occurred. It is possible to use a similar examination to reject the
idea that a boot distribution has been made as part of a
reorganization if there is no commercial, 43 non-tax motivation for
including the distribution in the reorganization. If it is not a boot
distribution, there is no problem under ordinary dividend concepts in
finding that it fits within the statutory definition of a "dividend." 44
THE COMMERCIAL MOTIVATION APPROACH
Judge Tannenwald's approach to this case is a basic departure
from the traditional concepts to which both the majority and Judges
Sterrett and Dawson felt bound to adhere. Critizing the majority
opinion as a "supine acceptance of the tyranny of labels" and noting
that Judge Sterrett "lends credence to this analysis by focusing upon
the reorganization provisions," 45 Judge Tannenwald, joined by Judge
Simpson, challenged the claim that the liquidation and dissolution of
the old Lammerts corporation needed to be treated as a liquidation
transaction within section 331 of the Internal Revenue Code. In
Joseph C. Gallagher,46 the Tax Court described this as an either-or
proposition: the dissolution either had to be part of a reorganization
or it must be accorded section 331 treatment as a liquidation. The
"supine acceptance of this tyranny of labels" was said "to escalate
41. 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
42. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163(a).
43. The commercial motivation test would be stricter than the business purpose test, see note
40 supra, and would focus on the individual steps of the transaction rather than on the
transaction as a whole as the business purpose test does.
44. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 316(a); cf id. §§ 301-02.
45. 54 T.C. at 447.
46. 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
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one prong of Joseph C. Gallagher, and Hyman H. Berghash47 . ..
from the level of a distinguishable rationale to a mandated doctrine of
wide application." 4 This contention appears to have merit since
greater weight traditionally has been accorded state law concepts in
interpreting the term "liquidation" as used in section 331 than in
interpreting the term "interest" as used in section 163. Yet, both the
dissent of Justice Douglas in Knetsch v. United States49 and the
opinion of the Tax Court in Lammerts are bottomed on an attempt to
reconcile the Code with state law. In Knetsch, the Supreme Court was
faced with a loan and annuity transaction which was valid under state
law, and indeed called for the lender to receive a profit as a result of
interest on the loan; Justice Douglas felt that this fact was controlling.
However, the Court rejected the idea that state law descriptors ended
the inquiry into the meaning of "indebtedness" and "interest" for
purposes of federal tax law.
In Lammerts, however, the majority opinion remains just as
rigidly bound to state law concepts of liquidation as was Justice
Douglas to state law concepts of indebtedness. Once the Court
decided that the events under consideration did not fit any statutory
definition of reorganization, the liquidation and dissolution of the
corporation under state law stood alone as a single event and the
Court did not inquire further whether the liquidation was sufficient
under section 331 of the Code. It was this dogmatic acceptance of
state law concepts that Judge Tannenwald rejected, saying that the
criteria of "form versus substance" were more than adequate to
compel the conclusion that the requirements of section 331 had not
been met because the liquidation was a sham.50
It is, of course, a familiar shibboleth of federal tax law that
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code is not dependent on state
law or common law concepts. Almost forty years ago, in Burnet v.
Harmel,5 1 the Supreme Court said:
Here we are concerned only with the meaning and application of a statute
enacted by Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power under the
Constitution, to tax income. The exertion of that power is not subject to State
control. It is the will of Congress which controls, and the expression of its will
47. 43 T.C. 743 (1965).
48. 54 T.C. at 447.
49. 364 U.S. at 370. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
50. 54 T.C. at 447.
51. 287 U.S. 103 (1932). See also Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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in legislation, in the absence of language evidencing a different purpose, is to be
interpreted so as to give a uniform application to a nation-wide scheme of
taxation . . . State law may control only when the federal taxing act, by
express language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent
upon state law.52
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which now has Lammerts on
appeal, strongly reaffirmed this principle in 1965 in Borax's Estate v.
Commissioner. 0 There the court considered the validity of a marriage
for purposes of determining the right to file a joint return for federal
income tax purposes. The State of New York, which had jurisdiction
over the taxpayer, had declared that the taxpayer's Mexican divorce
was invalid and that his subsequent remarriage was, therefore, also
invalid. Had the court of appeals accepted this determination as
binding for federal tax purposes, it would have affirmed the holding of
the Tax Court that the parties could not file a joint return. Instead, it
held that the decree of divorce was valid for federal tax purposes and
that the taxpayer's remarriage must also be recognized for tax
purposes. It noted two situations on which it did not intend to rule,
and these reservations are themselves instructive.
The first situation which was distinguished was the case where the
same jurisdiction which rendered the divorce subsequently found it to
be invalid. The court said that it would not rule on whether such a
divorce could be considered valid for tax purposes, thus clearly
indicating its unwillingness to be bound by state law. On the other
situation, the court said:
Secondly, we are not dealing with a situation where the rendering
jurisdiction's concept of a divorce is totally alien to that contemplated by the
tax laws. The test would not be whether the divorce would be declared invalid in
every state, but rather whether the divorce frustrated the revenue lpurposes of
the tax laws.-4
If it is possible that the concepts of divorce and marriage under
federal tax law may be alien to the state law concepts which in fact
determine the rights, duties, and status of individuals in the marital
relationship, it should not be difficult to accept Judge Tannenwald's
thesis that not all corporate liquidations undertaken according to the
laws of the state of incorporation must be accorded section 331
treatment.
52. 287 U.S. at 110.
53. 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966).
54. 349 F.2d at 672.
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Judge Tannenwald used motivation as a test to determine the
reality of the liquidation for federal tax purposes. He made no
attempt to distinguish between corporate and shareholder motivation
in making that determination, since the record was devoid of evidence
on either factor; he believed that the presence of a commercial
motivation of some sort was necessary to qualify for section 331
capital gain treatment. Since there was no such motivation in this
case, he found that the liquidation was not within section 331.
Judge Tannenwald was troubled in this holding by the fact that the
Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of corporate
liquidations even though motivated solely by tax considerations; his
example was United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.55 His
reference was undoubtedly to the Court's statement that
Congress has imposed no tax on liquidating distributions in kind or on
dissolution, whatever may be the motive for such liquidation. Consequently, a
corporation may liquidate or dissolve without subjecting itself to the corporate
gains tax, even though a primary motive is to avoid the burden of corporate
taxation.5-
However, this statement should not be taken to mean that a
liquidation under state law must always be recognized as such for all
tax purposes. Even though it might be accorded tax-free status at the
corporate level pursuant to the dictum quoted from Cumberland
Public Service, it could still fail to meet the requirements of section
331 for purposes of determining the tax treatment of the shareholders.
Judge Tannenwald is not particularly clear about the type of
commercial motivation which he would require for a liquidation to
qualify for section 331 treatment. If his position is to become the
foundation for future interpretation of section 331, it will be necessary
to clarify that requirement.
A rather clear case can be made for focusing on shareholder
motivation. First, it is clear that the question will not even arise if the
business of the corporation is not continued by a new corporation. If
the liquidation transaction results in the business being wound up or
permanently conducted in noncorporate form, there is no reason why
the transaction would not qualify under section 331. Whoever has
made the decision to liquidate has acted from a motivation which has
clear commercial, non-tax significance; the liquidation brings to an
55. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
56. Id. at 455.
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end the ownership of the business by a corporation. But even in
describing this relatively simple case, the dominance of shareholder
motivation is evident. It is the shareholders who make the decision to
liquidate; the managers and the board of directors may recommend it,
but the shareholders have the final responsibility for the decision.
Shareholder motivation becomes even more clearly dominant
when reincorporation of part or all of the business follows the
liquidation. Once the liquidation has occurred the shareholders are the
only possible persons involved in the subsequent decision to
reincorporate since they then directly own all the assets of the defunct
corporation. Furthermore, they decide which of the assets will go into
the new corporation and which will be held out. Thus, the
shareholders have the ultimate decision on three important matters:
first, the liquidation of the old corporation; second, reincorporation;
and third, the retention of some assets. Whether the transaction takes
the form of that in Lammerts, which was an uncomplicated
liquidation and reincorporation, or one of the more sophisticated
forms such as in Reef or Davant, the motivation behind those three
steps, no matter in what order they occur, will control the final shape
of the transactions. Thus, it is the combination of the three steps that
creates the tax issue.5 7
It may be helpful at this point to divide liquidation-
reincorporation cases into two categories, the difference between the
two being whether, at the time of the liquidation, there is an intention
to reincorporate. If no such intention exists, then no overall purpose
or motivation is behind the entire sequence of events; the purpose for
liquidating would be much the same as that in cases where no
reincorporation follows. Recently, in William C. Kind-" the Tax
Court faced that situation. In May, 1962, Kind, a retail florist,
dissolved the corporation which he owned and continued his florist
business as a sole proprietorship. In July, 1962, he became interested
in manufacturing and marketing a new plant food as an adjunct to his
florist shop. Because of the risks of this new undertaking, in January,
1963, he incorporated his entire business. The absence of an overall
plan for liquidating and then reincorporating was the basis for
rejecting the Commissioner's argument that these two events were
57. The same issue would possibly arise if no assets were retained in the reincorporation.
Such a transaction might be motivated by the idea of getting a stepped-up basis for assets at the
expense of a capital gains tax on the liquidation of the old corporation.
58. 54 T.C. 600 (1970).
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only parts of a single transaction. Accordingly, no reorganization was
found. However, treating each step as a separate transaction does not
necessarily determine whether the liquidation should qualify under
section 331. It might still be possible that the motivation involved in
the decision to reincorporate, even though that decision is made after
the liquidation, may be sufficiently "tainted" to disqualify the
liquidation from section 331 treatment. 9 This argument would be
strengthened if the taxpayer did not put all of the assets from the old
corporation into the new corporation. If only part of the corporate
assets are transferred to the new corporation, there should again be an
inquiry into shareholder motivation: what is the motive for retention
of some of the assets? In Kind, as an example, why did the taxpayer
fail to reincorporate all of the assets? This inquiry would likely
support a finding that the original liquidation was "tainted," or the
retention of the assets probably had a tax motivation even if the
liquidation did not.
However, a difficulty with rejecting section 331 treatment in the
Kind situation appears immediately. Treating the liquidation as a
separate taxable event but rejecting its qualification under section 331
would apparently require that the shareholders be taxed on the entire
distribution, even though a substantial portion of the assets eventually
goes back into the corporate solution. If section 331 does not apply,
then it is necessary to determine whether gain is measured in the same
way as in a liquidation-the difference between the fair market value
of the assets and the basis of the stock' 0-and whether tax is levied on
that amount, or whether the transaction is taxed as a distribution
under section 301. If the latter approach were adopted, the
distribution would be accorded dividend treatment under sections 301
and 316 to the extent of earnings and profits, and any remaining
amount would be first a reduction of basis and then a capital gain
distribution.6
The most plausible choice between these two alternatives would
59. Kind also recognized that qualification under section 331 is not dependent on dissolution
under state law. Id. at 605, citing Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir.
1965).
60. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001(a)-(b).
6 1. Id. § 301 (c). If the transaction were not deemed to be a section 301 distribution and if
gain is only realized to the extent that the amount realized exceeded basis, then such gain would
be ordinary income, not because of the presence of earnings and profits of the corporation, but
because, in the absence of section 331 coverage, there is no sale or exchange sufficient to warrant
capital gain treatment. Id. § 1221.
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appear to be section 301 treatment since there would be a distribution
with respect to stock. But, in that case, all of the accumulated
earnings and profits of the corporation would be taxed as an ordinary
dividend whether the shareholder had a gain or not. For example,
suppose a taxpayer acquired all of the stock of a corporation for
$100,000 at a time when the corporation's net book value was
$100,000, $90,000 of which consisted of accumulated earnings and
profits. If the shareholder then liquidated the corporation in a
transaction that did not qualify under section 331, even though the
shareholder would realize no gain, section 301 would require that he
be taxed on a dividend of $90,000. The remaining $10,000 would be
offset against his basis of $ 100,000, and he would be left with a basis
of $90,000 which would essentially disappear.12 Now consider further
that this shareholder subsequently put all but $25,000 worth of the
assets back into corporate solution; this reincorporation being the act
which prevented the liquidation from qualifying for section 331
treatment. The inequity of section 301 treatment is then apparent. If
the shareholder had the purpose of reincorporating at the time of
liquidation, he would have been treated as receiving either a dividend
of $25,000-if the transaction were held to be the equivalent of a
simple distribution of a dividend-or a return of capital, with no tax,
if the transactions were linked together to find a reorganization with
the $25,000 being a boot distribution.6 3 Thus, the shareholder setting
out on a liquidation-reincorporation scheme to bail out earnings and
profits would be treated less harshly than the shareholder who had no
intention of reincorporating or bailing out earnings at the time he
liquidated the corporation. This inequity would argue persuasively for
either rejecting section 301 treatment in favor of limiting the income
to that gain equal to the amount received over the basis, or accepting
the Tax Court's result in the Kind case.64
62. The distribution would not first be offset against basis because section 301 (c)(l) requires
ordinary income treatment to the extent that the distribution is out of earnings and profits.
Section 301(c)(2) would thus appear to apply only to the $10,000 which is not part of earnings
and profits. Of course, if there were a change in shareholder interest (for example, if two people
had bought the original corporation and one shareholder received no stock in the new
corporation), it might be said that this was in effect a redemption of the stock of the shareholder
whose interest had changed. In that case, section 302 would require that such shareholder receive
capital gain treatment.
63. Since there would be no gain, the limitations of section 356(a) would result in there being
no tax.
64. Although, when one posits the absence of any motivation to reincorporate, the holding
of the Kind case has great appeal, one cannot forget the difficulty of determining the absence of
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The second category of liquidation-reincorporation cases is, of
course, the one where an intention to reincorporate exists at the time
of the liquidation. In the example used above, where the shareholder
had no gain on the exchange, the issue is clearly posed as to whether
the reorganization provisions' 5 are the most realistic way of
determining the tax on such a transaction. If they are so considered,
there would be no tax under section 356 on the bail-out because this
shareholder had no gain. If, however, the distribution and retention of
the $25,000 is considered to be "functionally unrelated" to the
remainder of the transaction and is treated as a separate taxable
event, it would be taxed as an ordinary dividend. A consideration of
the overall motivation behind the transactions may be the only way to
make a choice between the two alternatives.
However, if Judge Tannenwald's approach is taken, the
liquidation is ignored because no commercial motivation exists; it is
not accorded section 331 treatment because the corporate existence is
considered to have continued unimpaired. Similarly, since there has
been no liquidation for tax purposes, there can be no "D"
reorganization and no boot distribution.66 Accordingly, the removal
of $25,000 from corporate solution must be viewed as a simple
distribution, taxable as a dividend. Obviously in this type of case little
differentiates the functionally unrelated approach and the decision
that no liquidation occurred. Both approaches turn on the question of
the intent for undertaking the transactions. In the simple case, there
may be no valid commerical reason for the steps except to obtain a
distribution without tax; in a more complex case, a variety of reasons
for the series of events may exist.
Such a case was recently before the Tax Court in American
Manufacturing Co.67 In that case a domestic subsidiary (Pintsch) of a
U.S. corporation sold its assets to a Canadian subsidiary (I.S.I.) of
the U.S. company for cash and then liquidated. Under these facts, the
Tax Court had little difficulty in finding that a "1D" reorganization
had occurred. There was a transfer of assets by Pintsch to I.S.I., both
controlled by the common parent, in exchange for stock and boot,
that motive at the time of liquidation, and a rule that would eliminate that determination in a
case like Kind would greatly ease the administration of the law.
65. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 351-68.
66. Id. § 368(a)(I)(D) requires a distribution which qualifies under sections 354, 355, or
356; section 354(b)(l)(B), the section pertinent here, requires a liquidation for the distribution to
qualify in a "D" reorganization.
67. 55 T.C. 204 (1970).
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followed by a liquidation of Pintsch. Difficulties concerning
compliance with section 354(b)(1)(A)'s requirement of a transfer of
"substantially all" of Pintsch's assets to I.S.I. were handled by using
the definition of "substantially all" of John G. Moffat;6" a similar
difficulty with compliance with the requirement of sections 354 and
368 of an exchange of stock was met by applying the constructive
issuance of stock rule of James Armour, Inc.69 That left the Tax Court
with the question of whether the removal of the cash that was
distributed to the parent company from the corporate solution was
functionally unrelated to the "D" reorganization. Facing the issue of
intent, the Tax Court said it was unnecessary to prove any business
reason to couple the distribution with the reorganization; it was
enough that the parties wanted to do so.
Congress recognized that legitimate reorganization could take place
concurrently with distributions of "other property" that had the effect of a
dividend. In effect, this distribution "dividend" is unnecessary to, or
"unrelated to" the legitimate reasons for the reorganization and Congress
realized this. We think this is clearly evidenced by the committee reports
accompanying the enactment of section 203(d)(2).. ..70
The . . .committee report indicates that when distributions other than
stock were received in connection with a reorganization, and had the effect of a
dividend, the distributions were to be governed by section 203(d)(2).72
The Tax Court then emphasized its statement, italicized in the above
quote, that the proper test is whether the distribution occurs "in
connection with" the reorganization:
We hold that the distributions herein must be treated under section 356(a)(2).
They were made in connection with an overall scheme of events, constituting a
section 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization and fall within the intent and purposes of
section 356(a)(2) treatment. 2
Once again Judge Sterrett differed on the importance to be
accorded to the question of intent. He pointed out that whatever the
68. 43 T.C. 558 (1964), affd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016
(1967).
69. 43 T.C. 295 (1964).
70. At this point the court quoted from H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15
(1924). 55 T.C. at 227. The Tax Court's reliance on this report for its conclusion seems
misplaced. The report actually reveals the Committee's lack of sophistication with liquidation-
reincorporation devices-not so strange considering that it was written in 1924-but clearly
shows its desire to treat distributions related to reorganizations in the same way that dividends
were then treated.
71. 55 T.C. at 227.
72. Id. at 228.
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reason that may have existed for the "D" reorganization, it was fully
accomplished by a transfer of assets from one subsidiary to another;
no commercial reason existed for the cash transfer and resultant bail-
out of earnings.
It is difficult to conceive of the business necessity for using cash as the
consideration for the transfer. Absent an explanation as to why the exchange
was not made in the usual manner, a realistic conclusion to be reached is that
Safety, as the sole shareholder of both Pintsch and I.S.I., availed itself of the
opportunity to siphon off the excess cash from I.S.I. by running it through
Pintsch and lumping it with the latter's liquidating distribution.
It would seem difficult to conclude from the facts in this case that the cash
transfer was in any sense an integral or even appropriate, part of the
reorganization. Having accepted the fact of a reorganization we are under no
compulsion to permit the parties to sweep all other exchanges under the same
protective umbrella merely because they were made to occur at the same time.
To do so would be to allow the statutory scheme to be subverted. 73
Here there was a non-tax, commercial purpose for the transfer of
assets from one subsidiary to another and that transaction was not
undertaken primarily as a means to siphon off cash from the
subsidiary; the transfer of assets could stand on its own reality and be
accepted as a "D" reorganization. In this sense, American
Manufacturing Co. differed from Casco Products Corp.74 where the
&&reorganization" was undertaken to achieve a redemption of the
shares of a dissenting minority of shareholders, and from Lammerts,
where the liquidation-reincorporation was clearly motivated by a
desire to bail out earnings by distributing property. In both Casco
and Lammerts, Judge Tannenwald's approach was to ignore the
liquidation. In American Manufacturing Co., the liquidation was also
ignored-it was not accorded section 332 status-but the reason was
quite different. There was a business motivation for the transfer of
assets from one corporation to another, but the transfer was part of a
plan which the Tax Court majority, including Judge Tannenwald,
found to be equivalent to a "D" reorganization. Thus, it seems clear
that Judge Tannenwald is examining the motivation of the
shareholders in accomplishing the entire sequence of transactions. If
there is valid commercial motivation for the reincorporation, apart
from the desire to give favorable tax treatment to the bail-out of
earnings and profits, then Judge Tannenwald apparently would accept
the validity of the entire transaction; if it appeared to be a
73. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
74. 49 T.C. 32 (1967).
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reorganization, he would reject the functional independence test and
permit the parties, as Judge Sterrett so aptly put it, "to sweep all
other exchanges under the same protective umbrelli merely because
they were made to occur at the same time. 75
It is ironic in a way that these two judges should differ on this
concept of functional independence. With Judge Tannenwald's heavy
reliance on motivation in determining whether a transaction should
be viewed as a liquidation, a reorganization or a simple distribution, it
is strange that he would reject the test of commercial motivation in
deciding whether a transaction should in all cases be treated as
functionally related to the other events which take place. Clearly, the
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. No reason appears why
the two judges could not differ on their approach to the Lammerts
case and still agree on American Manufacturing Co. It is quite
possible that Judge Tannenwald could view a series of events as not
accomplishing a section 331 liquidation and, further, believe that one
of the events is so functionally unrelated to the rest that it should be
considered a separate transaction. If he adopted that view, Judge
Tannenwald would probably have joined Judge Sterrett in dissent in
American Manufacturing Co. even though they wrote separate
opinions in Lammerts.
A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE
It'is predictable that any judicial solution to the liquidation-
reincorporation problem will grow out of one of these three separate
approaches described in Lammerts. Perhaps the functional
independence test will be expanded to exclude steps that had
previously been considered a part of the reorganization transaction,
or perhaps the definition of liquidation will be limited so that those
liquidations that are not intended to, and do not, end in the removal of
a going business from the umbrella of a corporation do not receive
section 331 capital gains treatment.
If neither of these approaches can gain additional support in the
courts, and if the rigid approach of the majority of the Tax Court
continues to dominate judicial treatment of liquidation-rein-
corporation transactions, it seems likely that Congress will once again
have to consider a statutory solution. Congressional responses to
loopholes in the taxing scheme are traditionally sledgehammer
75. 55 T.C. at 233.
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approaches with all the grace and refinement of a whale out of water.
This is not intended as carping criticism; when Congress deals with a
problem it is forced to deal in generalities and is under some
constraints about the breadth of the solution. When a court deals with
a tax problem, it deals with a specific problem and is not under the
same constraints. Thus, the judicial solution is likely to be more
sophisticated, less blunt, and more selective in its application. For this
very reason the courts should free themselves from the "tyranny of
labels" to which Judge Tannenwald refers and deal realistically and
reasonably with the Code and its policy, with sympathy not only for
taxpayers but also for the public. Were they to do so, the courts could
forge a far better taxing instrument, one capable of greater equity and
less abuse than Congress can ever hope to achieve if courts continue to
peevishly insist that if Congress didn't intend a particular result, it
should not appear to say that it did.
Should the courts take a sufficient interest in tax policy to turn
their abilities to achieving a more reasonable approach to liquidation-
reincorporation problems, it seems likely that motivation will play a
substantial part in their decisions. In Judge Sterrett's approach it will
be important to determine whether there is a commercial motivation
for coupling the particular step with the reorganization transaction. If
a substantial non-tax motivation can be found, then the functional
independence doctrine will not override the step transaction theory in
binding steps together if they are taken pursuant to a single plan. If
Judge Tannenwald's theory prevails, then the existence of commercial
motivation, principally that of the shareholders, will assume
importance in determining whether a liquidation transaction is
considered a sham, but there will continue to be a strong bias for
treating all contemporaneous events as part of the liquidation,
reorganization, or distribution transaction. Finally, the two
approaches may merge, with the courts requiring commercial
motivation for recognition of liquidations as well as for transactions
that could be viewed as having independent functions. Since these
approaches will all depend on non-tax motivations, tax counselors
would do well to examine carefully the reasons for proposed
transactions and caution clients about the changing nature of the law
in this area of liquidation-reincorporations before proceeding with
transactions that are primarily motivated by attempts to avoid the
full impact of the corporate income tax.

